Tenn. Op. Atty. Gen. No. 97-138, 1997

Office of the Attorney General
State of Tennessee

Opinion No. 97-138
October 9, 1997

Validity of Marriage That Was Performed by a Universal Life Church, Inc., Minister

Honorable Tim Burchett
State Representative
18th Legislative District
207 War Memorial Building
Nashville, TN 37243-0118

QUESTION

Are couples in Tennessee legally married when the person who conducted the ceremony was an ordained minister in the Universal Life Church, Inc.?

OPINION

The presumption in favor of marriage is very strong. The burden to rebut this presumption rests upon the party challenging the validity of the marriage and is not easily sustained. The marriage’s validity depends upon the context in which it is challenged, the specific facts involved, and the proof presented. Upon proper proof, a court could determine that the marriage was void if it determined, under the specific facts, that it was appropriate to examine the minister’s qualifications to solemnize a marriage under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-301(a) and the minister did not meet the statutory qualifications.

ANALYSIS

In Op. Tenn. Atty. Gen. U97-041, we opined that a person ordained by the Universal Life Church, Inc., which apparently has ordained anyone who filled out a mail order application, without a background check, verification or obtaining of any information, did not appear to meet the criteria of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-301(a) in order to be qualified to solemnize marriages. You have asked a follow-up question, regarding whether marriages conducted by such person are valid in this state. The answer depends upon the context in which the marriage’s validity is challenged, the specific facts involved, and the actual proof presented.

As the instant analysis will reflect, Tennessee courts have considered the validity of marriages in many different contexts, e.g., divorce actions; annulments; will contests by surviving heirs, including those alleged to be illegitimate children; wrongful death actions where the deceased’s recovery is claimed by multiple persons; third party challenges involving benefits to survivors, such as workers’ compensation benefits; actions for insurance recovery; contest to a marriage by family members; and criminal prosecution such as bigamy and non-support.

The public policy of “Tennessee and … the civilized world is to sustain marriages, not to upset them.” Madewell v. United States, 84 F. Supp. 329, 332 (E.D. Tenn. 1949). [FN1] Marriage, “being of vital public interest, is subject to state and legislative power and control, with respect to its inception, duration and status, conditions and termination, except as restricted by constitutional provision.” Crawford v. Crawford, 198 Tenn. 9, 14, 277 S.W.2d 389 (1955), citing 35 Am.Jur., p. 186. In the “interest of social order, the presumption in favor of [marriage] is very strong, and the pressure of that presumption is felt at every stage of the inquiry.” Gamble v. Rucker, 124 Tenn. 415, 417, 137 S.W. 499 (1911). Where there is “direct proof of the performance of a ceremony and consummation of a marriage … this evidence raises a prima facie case of a legal marriage.” Duggan v. Ogle, 25 Tenn. App. 467, 472, 159 S.W.2d 834, 838 (1941), cert. denied. The burden to rebut such presumption rests upon the party challenging the validity of the marriage. Duggan, 25 Tenn. App. 472-473; Whipple v. McKew, 166 Tenn. 31, 60 S.W.2d 1003 (1933). Such burden is not easily sustained as the evidence required has been described as “strong, distinct, satisfactory and conclusive” Duggan, 25 Tenn. App. at 473, 159 S.W.2d at 838, as well as “cogent and convincing.” Gamble, 124 Tenn. at 417; Aghili v. Saadatenejadi, 1997 W.L. 311544, p. 4 (Tenn. App. 1997); Hall v. Hall, 13 Tenn. App. 683, 688 (1931), cert. denied (1932). Indeed, if any evidence supports the presumption, the Court will sustain it. Duggan, 25 Tenn. App. at 472, 159 S.W.2d at 838.

As indicated above, Tennessee courts’ review of a marriage’s validity have depended upon who was challenging the marriage, the competent proof presented, the context of the challenge, and detailed review of the specific facts. In cases where a party established proof of attempts to comply with the marriage statutes, engaged in a ceremony followed by a subsequent relationship of substantial duration, and the parties thought they were married, courts have refused to disturb the marriage. See Johnson v. Johnson, 41 Tenn. 626, 631 (1860); Duggan v. Ogle, 25 Tenn. App. 467, 473, 159 S.W.2d 834, 838 (1941); Hale v. State, 179 Tenn. 201, 205, 164 S.W.2d 822 (1942); and Douglas v. Douglas, 6 Tenn. App. 12 (1927).

The Tennessee Supreme Court has explained that in cases in which marriage is technically unlawful, it is nevertheless sometimes presumed to be valid by use of the doctrine of estoppel to prevent fraud, as well as to preserve rights of innocent third parties who would be adversely affected by the parties’ conduct, but the doctrine is not available to protect the rights of persons who knowingly enter upon an immoral relationship. Crawford v. Crawford, 277 S.W.2d 389, 190 Tenn. 9 (1959). Generally “the party seeking to invoke the doctrine of estoppel had … believed in the validity of the marriage and evidenced that belief by cohabitation.” Rambeau v. Farris, 212 S.W.2d 359, 186 Tenn. 503 (1948). Where “there has been a marriage ceremony, insufficient to constitute a valid statutory marriage ab initio [from the beginning] the parties thereto nevertheless acquire the rights and incur the liabilities of married persons with respect to each other.” Madewell v. United States, 84 F. Supp. 329, 333 (D.C. Tenn. E.D. 1949), citing Allen v. Allen, 8 Tenn. App. 48 (1928); and Johnson v. Johnson, 41 Tenn. 826 (1860). [FN2]

The presumption of marriage and the doctrine of estoppel have been applied against third parties in cases involving employee survivor benefits. See, e.g., Huey Bros. Lumber Co. v. Anderson, 519 S.W.2d 588, 590 (1975); Kinnard v. Tennessee Chemical Co., 157 Tenn. 206, 7 S.W.2d 807 (1928). Subsequent cases have suggested the workers’ compensation decisions are based more upon dependency than relationship. Perry v. Sun Coal Co., 183 Tenn. 141, 191 S.W.2d 181 (1945).

Cases in which courts have refused an attempt to establish marriage based upon estoppel or presumption often involved no attempt at statutory compliance. [FN3] In Payne v. Payne, 142 Tenn. 320, 319 S.W.2d 4 (1919), the Court declined estoppel where the wife found out the marriage was void and subsequently took no action. The wife invoked estoppel after the death of her spouse. The Court rejected her request because she continued to live with the man after she found out he had a prior, still valid marriage. In Moore v. Moore, 1986 W.L. 8426 (Tenn. App. 1986), the Court found the marriage void where the officer who attempted to solemnize the marriage ceremony “was without authority to do so.” In Horn v. Shelton, 6 Tenn. Ct. Civ. App. 530 (1916), estoppel was not available where the illegality of the “marriage” was known to the woman.

In Aghili v. Saadatenejadi, 1997 W.L. 311544 (Tenn. App. 1997), the Court reiterated that “Tennessee protects the institution of marriage by presuming that regularly solemnized marriages are valid.” Aghili, at p. 4. Thus, “persons challenging a marriage must provide cogent and convincing evidence that the marriage is invalid.” Id. The grant of summary judgment was reversed where the husband failed his burden.

Similarly, the cases from other jurisdictions… [text continues exactly as provided]

John Knox Walkup

Attorney General and Reporter

Michael E. Moore

Solicitor General

Jennifer Helton Hann

Deputy Attorney General

[FN1]. See generally, “Informal Marriages In Tennessee – Marriage by Estoppel, by Prescription and by Ratification,” 3 Vanderbilt Law Review 610 (1949); “Use of Presumptions In Proving the Existence of Marriage Relationships in Tennessee,” 5 Memphis State Law Review 409, 410-411 (1975).

[FN2]. The principles of presumption and estoppel are not generally applied by courts to presume a marriage which is prohibited by law or against public policy. See, e.g., Bennett v. Anderson, 20 Tenn. App. 523, 101 S.W.2d 148 (1936).

[FN3]. This analysis largely omits discussion of “common law” marriage… See generally, 3 Vanderbilt Law Review, 610.

Tenn. Op. Atty. Gen. No. 97-138, 1997